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The commentators have brought a wealth of new perspectives to the question of how 
culture evolves. Each of their diverse disciplines—ranging from psychology to biology to 
anthropology to economics to engineering—has a valuable contribution to make to our 
understanding of this complex, multifaceted topic. Though the vast majority of their 
comments were supportive of my approach, it is natural that a reply such as this focus on 
points where my views differ from that of the commentators. 
The commentaries indicate strong support for the first basic premise of the paper: that 
culture does not evolve through a selectionist process. There are two unsympathetic 
commentaries, one of which (Simonton’s) offered no criticism, stating simply “space does 
not permit discussion here”. The rest of this commentary, which summarizes his own 
theory of creativity, has little relevance to the content of the target paper.  
The second unsympathetic commentary, Madsen and Lipo’s, claims that my 
“primary mission is to “save culture” from being subject to natural selection”. This is not 
the case; an examination of my papers on the topic over the last twenty years reveal the 
long and difficult struggle I went through trying to reconcile cultural change with the 
Darwinian perspective, initially believing that it was the only way to evolve.  
Madsen and Lipo argue that culture evolves through a selectionist process on the 
basis of the following claims: 
 
“First, Gabora’s argument is based upon a non-standard account of selection. Few if 
any geneticists or biologists would recognize genetic inheritance as powered by 
“self-replicating automata” of the von Neumann type. A “gene” (an incredibly 
complex concept in its own right [2]) certainly does not code both for the machinery 
to interpret itself, and for the protein its sequence represents.” 
 
I never claimed that a gene codes both for the machinery to interpret itself, and for the 
protein its sequence represents. I claimed that a genome—the set of all genes within an 
organism—constitutes a self-assembly code that is both interpreted during development 
and copied during reproduction, and this is standard biology; no living geneticist would 
argue with this.  
Madsen and Lipo continue: “Second, Gabora adds unnecessary conditions to the 
requirements for selection.” This is simply false, and the book by Holland that they cite at 
the end of this sentence says nothing about me, nor about unnecessary conditions to the 
requirements for selection. Instead of providing arguments to support their case they write: 
 
For example, the sequestration of inherited information, as in the isolation of germ-
line cells in many animal lineages, is a derived characteristic which evolved quite late 
in the history of life [9]. Natural selection proceeds handily in many taxa which do 
not sequester heritable information. 
 
Natural selection does not “proceed handily” in these taxa, but evolution does. Indeed 
that is exactly my point; it is those taxa evolve through, not natural selection, but communal 
exchange, and that served as the inspiration for the communal exchange theory of cultural 
evolution. I never said sequestration of inherited information is a requirement for evolution, 
I said it is a requirement for evolution through natural selection. This point is clearly 
understood by Smith (also an anthropologist), who writes, “As Carl Woese (1928-2012) 
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pointed out, biology must abandon molecular reductionism and enter the nonlinear world 
[see reference 2]. Cultural evolution models must do the same, and Gabora’s work is a 
significant step in the right direction.” For decades it has been accepted that evolution 
through means other than natural selection is widespread. In addition to those cited in the 
target paper (such as [16, 25, 28]) thousands of other papers could be cited. As Koonin [17] 
puts it in a paper titled ‘Darwinian evolution in the light of genomics’: 
 
“Comparative genomics and systems biology offer unprecedented opportunities for 
testing central tenets of evolutionary biology formulated by Darwin in the Origin of 
Species in 1859 and expanded in the Modern Synthesis 100 years later. Evolutionary-
genomic studies show that natural selection is only one of the forces that shape 
genome evolution and is not quantitatively dominant” 
 
Dagan and Martin [4] suggest that as little as 1% of all species actually evolves as per 
a Darwinian ‘tree of life’ model; the rest exhibit the kind of network structure that 
characterizes cultural evolution as discussed in the target paper. Indeed in prokaryotes this 
kind of non-Darwinian horizontal exchange is so rampant that it appears that no two genes 
have the exact same evolutionary history [2, 3, 13, 18, 19, 30, 31]. 
Madsen and Lipo also claim, “Nor is it required that new variation be approximated 
by a random process.” If the explanation provided in the target paper was not sufficiently 
clear, I encourage Madsen and Lipo to consult any basic population genetic text (such as 
Hartl and Clark’s [14]) to understand why natural selection entails random variation. Not 
only does generation operate prior to selection, but it can change the distribution of variants 
instantaneously, whereas selection requires generations to do so. The speed and 
effectiveness of a generation bias renders any selection bias negligible. Generation biases 
exist in the biological world (e.g., mutation biases or nonrandom mating), but to a degree 
that is miniscule compared with culture, where novelty is not just “biased by” but 
strategically designed to meet human needs, tastes, and preferences.  
The logic of this is seen clearly when one writes computer programs to simulate 
natural selection (as I once did as the teaching assistant for a population genetics class). 
Natural selection operates when some traits make it harder for organisms that bear them to 
survive and reproduce, so that there are fewer and fewer organisms with those traits in 
subsequent generations. The greater the extent to which variants are generated non-
randomly, the greater the extent to which what you end up with over time reflects not 
selection (which occurs after variants have come into existence) but the initial generation 
bias. To take a cultural example, the greater the extent to which, say, a novel is generated 
non-randomly, the greater the extent to which the wording and organization of novels 
reflect the thought processes of their authors. Madsen and Lipo do not provide any reason 
for their conviction that variation need not be random, nor do they address the arguments 
on this matter in the target paper. They merely cite a paper by anthropologists [15] that 
describes a model in which variation is generated through random copying error, i.e., a 
paper that in no way addresses their claim that natural selection can be operative when 
variation is non-random.  
Madsen and Lipo continue: 
 
“Third, Gabora criticizes the transfer of biological concepts to culture, by confusing 
theoretical concepts and empirical instances. For example, she claims that 
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“generations” are not applicable to culture. In reality, organismal generations are an 
empirical matter, and depend upon the details of a transmission process. For culture, 
the lack of a convenient empirical package to identify generations simply points to 
the need to define and model appropriate time scales for analysis.  
 
I am all for defining and modeling appropriate time scales for analysis, but that is 
irrelevant; in a realm where entities can appear to be ‘dead’ and then suddenly resume the 
characteristics of life, and do so regularly, the concept of ‘generation’ does break down. 
Madsen and Lipo then say: “Such a challenge is also routine in biology when germ-line 
sequestration is not present or reproduction is age-structured or reproduction continuous”. I 
agree; again, it was through my study of these problems in the microbial world that it 
became evident that they were problematic with respect to cultural evolution.  
Finally, Madsen and Lipo write: 
 
Using a well-accepted definition of natural selection [12], it is apparent that any 
population in which individuals vary in their phenotype, inherit the information 
underlying that phenotype, and where the success of individuals is affected by that 
heritable information, will evolve. Observed changes in the frequencies of heritable 
cultural information constitute natural selection, given these conditions. [bold added] 
 
It is ironic that they cite Lewontin here given his well-known critique of Darwinian 
approaches to culture [5]. In the situation they describe, information is not acquired but 
inherited, and therefore natural selection may be taking place. Nothing I have ever said 
contradicts this. However, they continue: 
 
In this light, Gabora’s EVOC model [1] displays all the hallmarks of natural 
selection, demonstrating that “communal exchange” is a viable model of an 
inheritance and selection process, not a replacement for selection. 
 
EVOC models an evolutionary process, but it exhibits characteristics that disqualify it 
as evolution through natural selection, such as, (1) information is acquired not inherited, 
and (2) variants are generated non-randomly, as discussed above, and discussed more 
extensively in the target paper. Thus it does not support the idea that communal exchange is 
an “inheritance and selection process”. As Lynch [20] puts it: 
 
It has long been known that natural selection is just one of several mechanisms of 
evolutionary change, but the myth that all of evolution can be explained by adaptation 
continues to be perpetuated by our continued homage to Darwin's treatise (6) in the 
popular literature. For example, Dawkins' (7–9) agenda to spread the word on the 
awesome power of natural selection has been quite successful, but it has come at the 
expense of reference to any other mechanisms, a view that is in some ways 
profoundly misleading. 
 
I agree with Smith that culture “retains a place for selection” in the sense that 
individuals select one brand of peanut butter over another. This is quite different from 
selection in the sense of a selectionist algorithm, i.e., selection of certain instruction sets 
that code for self-replicating structures at the expense of others. I agree with Orsucci that 
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an important related project is to study the co-evolution of cultural and genetic systems, and 
many including myself have taken steps in this direction. This has always been an 
important component of the communal exchange approach to cultural evolution, and 
although it is not developed extensively in this paper, it is an area ripe for future work. 
Establishing an adequate theoretical framework for cultural evolution will provide a natural 
foundation for work in this area. If in the future cultural evolution experiences (as did 
biological evolution did several billion years ago) what Vetsigian et al. [28] refer to as a 
Darwinian threshold, a transition from a communal exchange to a selectionist evolutionary 
process then, as Orsucci suggests, communal exchange and selectionist theories would be 
complementary components of a cohesive theory of cultural evolution.  
Orsucci also points out that, “A focus on artifacts and artistic expressions could lead 
to difficulties related to their iconic nature, in semiotic terms, and the identification of 
markers for underlying codes might be left to inferential and subjective approaches.” 
Fortunately, the need for inference is decreasing as neuroscience progresses toward the 
point where thoughts about artifacts and artistic expressions can be reliably connected to 
underlying patterns of neural activation. 
 
Communal Exchange Theory 
The commentaries also indicate strong support for the second basic premise of the paper: 
culture evolves through communal exchange amongst self-organizing, autopoietic 
networks, in a manner that is algorithmically similar to metabolism-first theories of the 
origin of life. Smith points out that the communal exchange approach to culture “avoids a 
monolithic conception of ‘culture’ (again a common item of critique in evolutionary 
approaches to culture)” and that it “places a premium on understanding the flow of cultural 
information communicates well with such traditional cultural-anthropological subjects as 
power relationships”. Kauffman points out that the fact that elements of culture do not 
evolve as separate entities but as facets of an integrated whole (a worldview) is particularly 
in evidence with respect to science, in that a scientific hypothesis builds upon (and may fall 
with) other scientific hypotheses. Kauffman also notes that enabling the user of the 
conceptual network program for documenting material cultural history to “introduce 
context-relevant attributes and perspectives is of particular importance, and should be 
highlighted,” because this shows “implicit acceptance that the phase space is not pre-state-
able”.  Indeed, the conceptual network program is part of a family of approaches referred to 
collectively as “human computation” systems [21] that tackle the kind of intractability 
Kaufman describes by merging the inductive abilities of individuals and crowds with the 
speed and accuracy of computers at algorithmically solvable tasks.  
One commentator (Brown) is in agreement with my critique of Darwinian theories 
of culture but unsympathetic with the view that culture evolves by some means. He claims,  
 
“The search for the “right” evolutionary framework for cultural change is obviously 
motivated by the belief that culture is something that “evolves.” … But how may 
cultural change be described as adaptive? … [I]n what sense might the proliferating 
use of video games or tanning salons be classified as adaptive cultural change?” 
  
It is true that video games and tanning salons may not be adaptive for humans 
evolving on a biological fitness landscape, but that is not relevant to their cultural 
evolution, and indeed the two are often at odds. A cultural adaptive landscape need not be 
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defined by natural laws; all that is necessary is that there exist some criterion according to 
which some outputs rate higher than others. This rating can be in terms of number of 
offspring, as in biology, or it can be defined by human-made rules, preferences, or even 
dollars. As Smith notes, the communal exchange approach, “highlights the importance of 
individual agency in reshaping culture moment by moment”.  
Brown also claims,  
 
“An adaptive genotypic trait gives survival advantages to all members of the species 
that possess it. By contrast, a successful—meaning broadly rooted—cultural 
innovation (such as intellectual property rights) may advantage some individuals or 
groups and disadvantage others.”  
 
Brown is mistaken that biological and cultural evolution differ in this respect. There 
are genetic traits that benefit some individuals and that are maladaptive for, detrimental to, 
or even not expressed at all in, others. A classic example of this is the gene that causes 
sickle-cell anaemia in homozygous individuals (those who bear two copies of the gene), but 
confers resistance to malaria in heterozygous individuals (those who bear one copy of the 
gene). As another example, genes that make an individual exhibit a sudden growth spurt 
during adolescence are beneficial for basketball players but not for gymnasts. 
Bejan suggests that development of a communal exchange framework for cultural 
evolution falls under the umbrella of construal law, a program that investigates the physical 
rules underlying designs, both natural and human-made. Some might fear that use of the 
word “design” implies a “designer” but as I understand it, Bejan uses the term to refer to 
form that emerges or evolves through low-level physical processes as well as form that 
comes about through the actions of intentional agents. I am sympathetic toward attempts to 
develop this kind of unified framework, and my colleagues and I have made similar efforts 
[1, 9, 10, 11]. Bejan’s framework is interesting, though in my view somewhat too 
simplified with respect to its characterization of living, cognitive system to capture their 
essential features. For example, there is much more to being alive than “to persist in time” 
(indeed a dead body continues to “persist in time”, and non-living systems often persist 
substantially longer than living ones). As another example, Bejan’s explanation for how 
physics can explain even the existence of the peacock’s tail invokes “mating”, which is not 
the domain of physics. Nevertheless his commentary demonstrates that by viewing 
biological and cultural systems through the lens of construal theory one gains a refreshingly 
new and valuable perspective.  
Simonton outlines a theory of creativity that ignores “the minor complications 
introduced when selection is sequential rather than simultaneous”. However, selection by 
definition entails that entities are simultaneously chosen amongst; selectionist processes are 
subject to order effects such that if some are selected before others, they change the fitness 
landscape by which the others are evaluated. Thus a selectionist model by definition cannot 
describe sequential change. Moreover, sequential change is not a “minor complication”; it 
necessitates a different mathematical structure (for discussion, see [6, 7, 8]). Furthermore, 
sequential refinement of ideas over time is the rule, not the exception. Indeed the exception 
to this rule, the only sort of creativity that a model such as Simonton’s could hope to 
describe, is insight, where an idea manifests suddenly and unexpectedly. However insight 
would seem to be more aptly described as reflecting a phase transition, i.e., a sudden re-
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organization of knowledge due to self-organized criticality [6, 24], rather than an executive 
level selection amongst competing alternatives.  
Another problem with Simonton’s theory of creativity is that it starts from the 
assumption that “the individual produces a set X containing the potential solutions x1 ... xi ... 
xk, where k ≥ 1”. It is not explained how different x1 has to be from xi to be considered a 
different solution; indeed it is generally the case that different possibilities constitute a 
family of interrelated solutions. Without going into the details, this interrelatedness is why 
in the honing theory of creativity they are characterised as different actualizations of a core 
idea, which exists, initially, in a “ground state”, or state of potentiality [6, 7, 12].  
I conclude by saying that I am grateful to the commentators for their diverse 
perspectives and insights, their overall support for the project, and provocative ideas for 
where to go from here. Clearly there are many fascinating avenues to explore as we move 
forward on our quest to understand how culture evolves.  
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